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FORCING COOPERATION:
A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE
Rachelle Y. Holmes*

The current U.S. deterrence-based tax enforcement regime is failing.
Despite the continual passage of new penalties and reporting
requirements, large businesses remain able to keep their income out of
the reach of the federal treasury. While the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) has struggled with the decreasing effectiveness of its
enforcement efforts, jurisdictions, such as Australia, have been able to
achieve increased compliance rates as a result of transitioning to a
cooperative tax model. This type of regime focuses on resolving
emerging taxpayer issues in real-time, providing taxpayers with
helpful, readily available guidance, and creating positive incentives
for compliant taxpayers, such as the ability to book tax benefits more
quickly and with lower compliance costs.
This Article argues for an adoption of a cooperative tax regime in the
U.S., and more importantly proposes a framework for its
implementation. Because many businesses are already able to
successfully game the current system, they may be reluctant to
voluntarily cooperate with the IRS based on the mere expectation of
cooperation-based benefits. In order to combat this resistance, this
Article argues that the IRS will have to delineate sharper compliance
choices for taxpayers by broadening the spectrum of applicable
compliance standards.
This Article proposes that the IRS implement a system in which noncooperation is met with strict liability and heightened compliance
standards, while cooperation is rewarded with expanded pre-filing
programs, decreased liability standards, and lower compliance costs.
When faced with these two choices, most taxpayers should, over time,
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choose to cooperate. Those who do not, however, will be met with
more targeted enforcement. By widening the gap between the two
enforcement regimes, taxpayers will be forced to signal their
cooperative intentions to the IRS, which the IRS can then dynamically
use this information to make its post-filing efforts more effective and
“force” more taxpayers onto the path of cooperation.
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INTRODUCTION
Large business entities (LBEs) 1 and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS or Service) are locked in an ongoing battle over revenue. In this
tax war, savvy LBEs facing daunting competition from their global
counterparts are responding aggressively by minimizing all undue costs,
including the money they willingly hand over to the federal
government. 2 Although tactical implementations among LBEs do vary,
most strive to adeptly navigate the gray line between patently
impermissible “tax evasion” and questionable “tax avoidance” 3 by
exploiting weaknesses in the tax law while complying with the black
letter rules directly on point. 4 On the opposing side of the field is the
IRS, which can rightfully be categorized as the underdog because it is at
a systematic disadvantage to the LBEs. The U.S. tax system relies
heavily on the self-reporting of transactions through the filing of tax
returns. LBEs are able to report their transactions as aggressively as
they deem feasible. The IRS, through audits, is then assigned with the
daunting task of auditing the returns, discovering and assessing any
offending transactions, and ultimately fighting with the LBEs about the
proper amount of taxes owed. Often understaffed and outwitted, IRS
1. As referred to herein, LBEs include corporations and pass-through entities with $250 million
or more in gross assets.
2. Many global competitors have the advantage of being located in low- or no-tax jurisdictions.
The U.S. corporate tax system is increasingly perceived, both domestically and abroad, as being
disadvantaged in many respects, including its relatively high statutory corporate tax rates and unduly
complex tax provisions. See generally Compliance Concerns Relative to Large and Mid-Size
Businesses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 109th Congress 1 (2006) (Written Testimony of
Mark Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue) [hereinafter Everson Compliance Report] (“[LBE]
taxpayers are sophisticated, well-capitalized, well-organized, and adept at planning. Particularly in the
case of public companies, they are driven to show high after-tax profitability to shareholders in a very
competitive and complex economic environment. They have the resources and willingness to
aggressively defend and contest tax positions.”).
3. As referred to herein, “tax evasion” is an impermissible failure to comply with the tax laws,
which can result in potentially large penalties and criminal sanctions. “Tax avoidance” is the legal, but
IRS-disapproved, minimization or elimination of taxes through structures which often exploit loopholes
and other weaknesses in the law. Although not illegal, many tax avoidance transactions would be
challenged or disrupted by the IRS if discovered. See generally Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax
Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 124 n.69 (2009) (explaining the “familiar but elusive
distinction” between tax avoidance and tax evasion).
4. Former IRS Commissioner Mark Everson noted that as “the Code continues to expand,
becoming more complex and challenging to administer, [LBEs] are able to utilize every available
resource to explore opportunities to reduce their tax liability by using the most intricate and complicated
Code provisions . . . .” Offshore Abuses: The Enablers, the Tools, and Offshore Secrecy: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs’ Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 109th
Cong. 2 (2006) (Testimony of Mark Everson, Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv.). See also Sheldon D.
Pollack, Tax Complexity, Reform, and the Illusion of Tax Simplification, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 249-75
(1994) (noting there is no shortage of methods by which taxpayers can engage in tax avoidance
schemes).
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agents have resorted to using every penalty, sanction, procedural tactic,
threat, and common law doctrine available in their arsenal to capture the
elusive LBE income base for the U.S. Treasury chest. 5
Not surprisingly, both sides of this game have developed enormous
amounts of mistrust and resentment towards their opponent as they try to
defend their diametrically opposed economic interests. After all, the
stakes of this battle are extremely high.
The proliferation of
sophisticated evasion techniques and aggressively structured tax
products results in billions of dollars in lost tax revenue each year to the
U.S. fisc. 6 Not only is there no shortage of methods by which taxpayers
can engage in tax avoidance and evasion transactions, but also LBEs and
their advisors have become particularly masterful at masking these
transactions from detection by IRS agents, who would undoubtedly shut
them down if discovered. The U.S. Treasury and many practitioners
agree this phenomenon has created a crisis of sorts in the U.S. tax
system and is responsible for the escalating feelings of distrust and
suspicion among LBEs and the IRS. 7
Congress and the IRS have employed a number of measures to curtail
this trend. In particular, a command-and-control deterrence-based
approach has dominated their reform efforts and has resulted in a
heightened focus on augmenting sanctions and penalties. 8 These
5. See generally David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 335–36 (2006)
(describing the Service’s uphill enforcement battle). See also infra notes 105–108 and accompanying
text (enumerating recent rules and regulations aimed at procuring taxpayer compliance).
6. It is estimated that the U.S. corporate tax gap, that is the amount of revenue the U.S.
estimates it should receive from corporations less the amount of revenue it voluntarily and timely
collects, is approximately $30 billion. Everson Compliance Report, supra note 2, at 2 (“The National
Research Program (NRP) results provided last February estimate the underreporting non-compliance by
larger corporations in 2001 to be $25 billion. The estimate for all corporations is $30 billion.”). The
IRS estimated “that abusive corporate tax shelters contributed $10 to $15 billion of the $30 billion in
unreported . . . corporate income taxes.” James Bickley, CRS Updates Report on Proposals to Narrow
Tax Gap, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 145-26 (2009).
7. Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88
TAX NOTES 221, 230 (2000); see also Allen Kenney, Tax Enforcement Makes GAO’s 2005 List of HighRisk Areas, 106 TAX NOTES 531, 531 (2005) (“‘Given the broad declines in IRS’s enforcement
workforce, IRS’s decreased ability to follow up on suspected noncompliance, the emergence of
sophisticated evasion concerns, and the unknown effect of these trends on voluntary compliance, IRS is
challenged on virtually all fronts in attempting to ensure that taxpayers fulfill their obligations . . . .’”
(quoting Government Accountability Office report)).
8. Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Taxation: Introduction, 29 LAW & POL’Y 3,
4 (2007) (noting the current U.S. tax administration has a “command-and-control operational system to
accomplish their mission of catching ‘the scoundrels’ who do not pay their tax”). The deterrence
doctrine can be traced back to the classic work of Jeremy Bentham. JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF
PENAL LAW (1788), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365 (William Tait ed., 1859).
The basic premise of his classic utilitarian theory of crime is that people are rational actors who behave
in a manner that will maximize their expected utility. In other words, individuals assess opportunities
and risks and disobey the law when the anticipated fine and probability of being caught are small in
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deterrence-based tactics are not yielding their desired results, primarily
because detection and penalty rates cannot realistically exist at levels
that will meaningfully deter wrongdoing. 9 As a result, notwithstanding
the onslaught of new fines and penalties, LBEs still are able to
consistently keep their income out of the reach of the fisc. 10
As an alternative to the government’s current approach, this Article
argues for the adoption of a cooperative, as opposed to deterrence-based,
tax regime, 11 and proposes a framework for its implementation. In a
recent article, Alex Raskolnikov suggested that the IRS use informationforcing mechanisms to reveal taxpayer motives in order to enable a more
efficient targeting of tax enforcement efforts. 12 His intuition of
separating so-called “gamers” from “non-gamers” for enforcement
purposes can also be used to induce non-cooperating LBE taxpayers to
become cooperators by applying a dynamic sorting mechanism to the
pre-filing process. In particular, this Article argues that by making strict
liability the default for LBE taxpayers and simultaneously opening up
access to pre-filing resolution programs, the IRS will be able to jump
start the transition of the current command-and-control regime into a
cooperative one.
A cooperative model of tax regulation has the potential to provide a
better foundation for taxpayer compliance, not only in the immediate

relation to the profits to be made through non-compliance. Becker expanded on this model by arguing
that authorities needed to find an appropriate balance between increasing sanctions and increasing
detection rates to make compliance behavior the rational economic choice. Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). For criticism of Becker’s analysis,
see, for example, Nicholas Stern, On the Economic Theory of Policy Towards Crime, in ECONOMIC
MODELS OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 123 (J. M. Heineke ed., 1978).
9. See generally Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence,
and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 582 (2006). This is true even with respect to
LBEs that are under continuous audit.
10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11. In recent years, more scholars have begun to recognize the benefits of, and have begun to
push for, a movement towards more cooperative tax regulation. See generally Braithwaite, supra note 8,
at 4; Dennis Ventry, Cooperative Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 436 (2008); Jenny Job et al.,
Culture Change in Three Taxation Administrations: From Command-and-Control to Responsive
Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y 84 (2007). Hallmarks of a cooperative regime include: (i) rewarding
cooperation and compliance; (ii) allowing taxpayers to obtain certainty on tax issues on a real-time
basis; (iii) advocating taxpayer assistance, rather than abuse; (iv) sanctioning small violations mildly and
serious violations heavily; and (v) enhancing penalties for the non-cooperative. Id.; Edward J.
McCaffery & Joel Slemrod, Toward an Agenda for Behavioral Public Finance 20 (CLEO Research
Paper No. C04-22, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=590201
(describing policy recommendations of “tax morale” literature).
12. Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009). See also Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Enforcement for Gamers: High
Penalties or Strict Disclosure Rules?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55 (2009) (critiquing
Raskolnikov’s proposal).
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future, but going forward as well. 13 Although penalties and fines still
need to exist as a baseline level for enforcement, the purely adversarial
nature of command-and-control tax regulation fosters increased
resentment and mistrust by taxpayers, which ultimately results in greater
resistance and non-compliance. 14 A cooperative tax regime can be
superior to an adversity-based one because it can cultivate an
environment where otherwise resistant taxpayers and tax regulators are
willing to “trade secrecy for certainty.” 15 This type of cooperative
model will allow taxpayers to obtain certainty with respect to their tax
positions pre-filing and thus allow them to book tax benefits
immediately for financial accounting purposes. 16 It will also make them
subject to fewer resource-consuming post-filing challenges, audits, and
adjustments. At the same time, if a taxpayer is willing to have an
ongoing transparent dialogue with government agents, the IRS will be
better positioned to identify emerging compliance issues and risks, and
more effectively allocate its limited resources. 17 Thus, from both a
present-day and long-term perspective, cooperative tax regulation can
yield superior benefits to the current deterrence-based regime for both
taxpayers and tax regulators. 18
13. Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 71, 83–84 (2003) (suggesting that governments should encourage reciprocal compliance behavior
by emphasizing other taxpayers’ compliance rather than the possibility of audit); Steven M. Sheffrin &
Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance,
in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 193, 214 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992)
(“Increased enforcement efforts [in the area of tax compliance] might result in a perverse indirect
increase in future noncompliance if the enforcement mechanism reveals to the affected taxpayer (and
associates) that it is relatively easy to get away with evasion.”); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAW (2006) (finding that people are more likely to comply voluntarily with laws when they perceive
that those laws are enforced through fair procedures).
14. Kristina Murphy, Enforcing Tax Compliance: To Punish or Persuade?, 38 ECON. ANALYSIS
& POL’Y 112, 128 (2008) (study of 652 tax offenders in Australia suggested that “in order to prevent
possible re-offending after an enforcement experience, regulators should aim to adopt enforcement
procedures that emphasize reintegration and the fair treatment of offenders”); Marsha Blumenthal,
Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a
Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125 (2001); Doreen McBarnet, When
Compliance is Not the Solution but the Problem: From Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude, in
TAXING DEMOCRACY: UNDERSTANDING TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 229 (Valerie Braithwaite ed.,
2003) [hereinafter McBarnet, TAXING DEMOCRACY].
15. For instance, taxpayers desirous of certainty with respect to uncertain tax items would be
willing to get input from the IRS on the tax treatment of their transactions pre-filing in order to book the
purported tax benefit for accounting purposes, even though the IRS may not have otherwise detected the
transaction in audit. See Ventry, supra note 11, at 436.
16. See infra Part III.A (discussing the new financial accounting regulations).
17. See Ventry, supra note 11, at 436.
18. In fact, Australia, which also was suffering high levels of noncompliance, completely
overhauled its deterrence-based regime and replaced it with a cooperative-based model. Even taking
into account the significant cultural and administrative difficulties that were encountered as a result of

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/4

6

Holmes: FORCING COOPERATION: A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE
H-HOLMES

2011]

8/27/2011 5:09:08 PM

IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE

1421

Even if a cooperative tax regime is superior to a contentious one, the
question remains: Given their long history of mistrust, how can the IRS
and taxpayers transition into such a relationship? In this tax game, the
players have a deeply rooted antagonistic posture towards each other.
Although greater gains for both sides may realistically be achieved
through cooperation, neither side is willing to give up any ground based
on their justified suspicion as to the other side’s motives. Because
taxpayers are currently on the winning side of the war, they have very
little incentive to abandon their current strategies with the IRS. As long
as the money and resources they spend to develop innovative tax
avoidance structures outweigh the present value of any potential
penalties and fines that may be levied upon detection, most taxpayers
will continue their status quo. 19 Some scholars have suggested that
encouraging taxpayer participation in the regulatory process and offering
rewards such as tax rebates to compliers can help transition taxpayers to
a more cooperative model. 20 Others have focused on the need for
changing the attitudes and cultures of the regulators. 21 This Article,
however, argues that in order to effectively spur a transition to a
cooperative regime, the IRS will have to first make a decisive move that
will significantly change the playing field for LBEs.
Part I of this Article discusses the failures of the current deterrencebased tax compliance model. Part II provides an overview of the
Service’s ad hoc attempts at cooperative regulation, which focus on prefiling resolutions of taxpayer issues.
Part III argues that a
comprehensive cooperative approach to tax regulation would be
beneficial to both taxpayers and the IRS. It further analyzes Australia’s
conversion into cooperative tax regulation as a potential model for an
effective approach. Part IV outlines how the United States should work
towards forcing a comprehensive cooperative regulation regime for
LBEs by combining a heightened liability standard with expanded prefiling resolution programs. It also explores challenges that the IRS may
face and acknowledges ancillary consequences that may ensue as a
this drastic change in culture, initial reports have demonstrated substantial improvements in collections
and compliance. For a fuller discussion of Australia’s reform, see infra Part III.E.
19. It is worthwhile to note, however, that some LBEs, even when on the right side of the law,
have backed away from some strategies for fear of public shaming that may be associated with tax
avoidance schemes. See, e.g. Michael Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols,
Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863
(2004) (discussing ways in which Congress has resorted to shaming practices in order to discourage
undesirable taxpayer behaviors, such as banning corporations who have moved their tax residence
offshore from entering into certain U.S. government contracts).
20. Ventry, supra note 11, at 436.
21. Job et al., supra note 11, at 86; Sagit Leviner, A New Era of Tax Enforcement: From ‘Big
Stick’ to Responsive Regulation, 42 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 381, 382 (2009).
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result of the proposed forced cooperative model.
I. FAILURES OF THE TRADITIONAL DETERRENCE MODEL
Direct enforcement is often the cheapest and most effective way to
deter wrongdoing and is the quintessential strategy for enforcing legal
norms. 22 However, when dealing with LBEs in the current tax regime,
direct enforcement efforts that rely on the traditional deterrence model
do not work. Low detection rates, combined with inadequate penalties,
and enormous information asymmetries, leave the IRS at a vast
disadvantage in attempts to restrain taxpayers from taking overly
aggressive or abusive positions on their tax returns. Not only is the
deterrence model unable to function to effectively prevent taxpayer
wrongdoing (i.e. penalties and detection rates cannot realistically be
made high enough to outweigh expected tax benefits), but also a model
based strictly on deterrence does not fully explain the existing levels of
compliance among LBE taxpayers given the relatively low penalty and
detection rates. 23 Moreover, the iron-gloved regulatory approach
associated with the penalty and audit regimes fosters an environment of
mistrust and perpetrates an antagonistic relationship between LBEs and
the Service.
From a purely logistical standpoint, the IRS cannot feasibly review
the majority of the nearly 10 million business returns it receives each
year. 24 As a result, audit rates, and ergo opportunities for misconduct
detection, are invariably low, leaving taxpayers often happy to play the
so called “audit lottery.” 25 This is true even with respect to non-de
22. Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 53, 56 (1986).
23. This is in part due to the secondary information reporting that the IRS is able to get from
LBEs, which makes a large portion of their earnings known to the IRS. There is some level of
compliance, however, that may be more linked to norm or other social based models. See generally
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recommendations for the IRS, 8 FLA.
TAX REV. 599, 612–17 (2007). See also Raskolnikov, supra note 12, at 696–97 (citing the nonexhaustive list of alternative “nonrational” explanations to include being guided by a sense of duty,
complying out of habit, and reflecting perceptions of fairness of the tax burden); Eric A. Posner, Law
and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1794–98 (2000) (positing that
the effects of the negative signals that noncompliance may bring to the evading taxpayer can add
significant weight to the cost–benefit analysis calculation); James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan
Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 819, 841–43 (1998); Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of
Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 643, 649–50 (2005).
24. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FISCAL YEAR 2009 ENFORCEMENT RESULTS (2010) [hereinafter
IRS FY 2009 RESULTS], available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/fy_2009_enforcement_results.pdf.
Business returns include small and large corporation returns and subchapter S and partnership pass
through returns. Id. at 4.
25. See generally Raskolnikov, supra note 9, at 582.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/4

8

Holmes: FORCING COOPERATION: A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE
H-HOLMES

8/27/2011 5:09:08 PM

2011]

IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE

1423

minimis corporate taxpayers. In fact the audit rate for corporations with
$250 million or more in assets, which account for more than 75% of
total corporate tax revenue, was just over 25% in the 2009 fiscal year. 26
Thus, although a select number of top-income corporations are under
continuous audit, nearly three-quarters of corporate LBEs go unaudited
each year. As indicated in Figure 1 below, the audit rate for corporate
LBEs has been dropping dramatically over the past five years, and is
significantly down from the 44% rate in the 2005 fiscal year. Even
among the largest of these corporations—those with assets of $5 billion
or more—the audit rate has declined 17% over the last two years, from
78% in 2007 to 64% in 2009. 27 Although some of this reduction is due
to a strategic shift in audit resources to large pass-through entities, which
comprise an ever-growing segment of business tax filers, much of the
reduction is due to stretched and shrinking IRS resources. 28
Figure 1
IRS Audits of Corporations with $250M or More in Assets 29
No. of Returns

No. of Audits

% Audited

FY 2005

11,018

4,859

44.1%

FY 2006

12,148

4,276

35.2%

FY 2007

12,588

3,424

27.2%

FY 2008

13,336

3,654

27.4%

FY 2009

14,673

3,771

25.7%

Even if the IRS does audit a taxpayer’s return, the auditors may not
have the time or requisite experience to intuit what particular
transactions the taxpayer has in fact engaged in, or what areas of the
return require more in-depth probing. For example, the typical tax
return of a large multinational taxpayer can be thousands of pages
long. 30 The filings for large pass-thru entities can be even more
26. IRS FY 2009 Results, supra note 24; Internal Revenue Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No.
4198 (7-2010), 2010 Tax Statistics (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
10taxstatscard.pdf; Syracuse Univ., IRS Face-to-Face Audits of Federal Income Tax Returns Filed by
Corporations, http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/trends/v15/corporations.html (last visited June 13, 2011).
27. Syracuse Univ., Despite Rising Deficits, IRS Audits of the Largest and Richest Corporations
Decline, http://trac.syr.edu/tracirs/newfindings/v15/#table4 (last visited June 13, 2011).
28. See, e.g., Michael Joe, IRS Enforcement Revenue Slips in Fiscal 2008, 2008 TAX NOTES
TODAY 247-51.
29. IRS FY 2009 RESULTS, supra note 24. The IRS fiscal year runs from October 1 through
September 30.
30. IRS Releases Tax Season Statistics on Business Return Filings, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 71-
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complex. Field agents, understandably, may have significant difficulty
detecting wrongdoing by the taxpayer. Not only is the sheer volume of
information daunting, but questionable tax positions can be hidden
among or lumped in with other non-controversial items. 31 Taxpayers
even intentionally throw the auditors off the trail by adding unnecessary
entities or elements to their transactions in order to disguise abusive or
questionable items they may have on the return. 32 As such, even if the
IRS were able to achieve a 100% audit rate for all LBEs, the ability for
auditors to discover and collect revenues from offending transactions is
significantly compromised and insufficient to meaningfully deter
wrongdoing.
When taxpayers are able to rely, not only on low detection rates, but
also on penalty defenses and low government detection and enforcement
success as well, the ex ante calculus of whether to enter into an
aggressive transaction can heavily favor pushing the envelope as far as
possible. First, even if the questionable transaction is detected,
reasonable basis and good faith defenses are available with respect to
non-tax shelter transactions, which may bar the imposition of any
penalties. 33 Furthermore, even if penalties are imposed, the actual
penalty level will be low relative to the detection risk. Indeed, given a
detection rate of 26%, penalties would need to be increased dramatically
in order for the expected economic value of the taxpayer’s tax benefit to
be low enough to deter them from entering into the transaction. 34
Assuming that a non-compliant LBE does not engage in criminal
misconduct, the largest penalty that it can expect is a 75% fraud
penalty. 35 More likely, however, the penalty would only be a 20% or
40% accuracy penalty. 36 Assuming a maximum penalty of 75% and an
average detection rate equal to the audit rate of 26%, a taxpayer’s
expected cost of avoiding a $100 tax liability would be only $45.50—an
amount equal to less than half of the $100 expected cost of paying the
tax liability up front with the initial return. Assuming a more realistic
maximum penalty of 20% and a detection rate equal to half the audit rate
13.
31. See Raskolnikov, supra note 9, at 572.
32. See Schizer, supra note 5, at 331.
33. See infra Part IV.A.1.
34. Doran, supra note 3, at 126–27; Ventry, supra note 11, at 439–40.
35. I.R.C. § 6663(a) (2006). The IRS has the burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. § 6663(b).
36. Taxpayers engaged in non-reportable or non-tax shelter transactions are generally subject to a
20% accuracy-related penalty on underpayments of tax that are due to negligence or disregard of the
rules or to understatements that are “substantial.” I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (West 2010). The penalty
increases to 40% if the underpayment is the result of a gross valuation misstatement. Id. § 6662(h)(1).
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(i.e., misconduct is detected by an IRS audit 50% of the time), the
taxpayer’s expected cost of avoiding a $100 tax liability would be only
$15.60. Accordingly, in order for the deterrence model to be effective
even under the most stringent assumptions, taxpayers would need to be
subject to penalties in excess of 285%. 37 Inarguably, penalties at this
level would not be politically feasible because notwithstanding the
deterrent effects, public and political perception remains that tax
penalties should approximately correlate to the severity of the offense
which is being penalized. 38
Additionally, while the deterrence model surely accounts for some
baseline level of LBE taxpayer compliance, it does not adequately
explain a great portion of it. If the deterrence model was solely
responsible for guiding LBE behavior, LBEs generally would only pay a
fraction of the total taxes they owe. 39 Other controls, however, such as
withholding and independent reporting obligations (e.g., those made to
the Securities and Exchange Commission), are in place. Thus, with
respect to a significant portion of LBE income, the compliance rate is
high because secondary or backup information controls are in place to
help restrain taxpayer misbehavior. However, at any given income
level, the actual amount of tax liability due can vary greatly. Therefore,
a large part of the tax gap with respect to LBEs does not hinge on hiding
income per se, but rather on the way in which the taxpayer’s income is
manipulated and reported for tax purposes. As discussed above, the IRS
agents must navigate thousands of pages of data in order to untangle or
reverse engineer an LBE’s transaction reporting and ultimately deduce a
“proper” tax liability figure. 40 This can be a daunting or even
impossible task for the resource-restrained government. Accordingly, a
more cooperative model in which the IRS could gain insight pre-filing
as to the manner and methods by which LBE taxpayers are reporting
transactions, should significantly improve compliance statistics.

37. Assumes a 75% penalty rate and 26% detection rate.
38. Indeed, numerous criticisms have already been raised regarding the IRS’s disproportionate
level of penalties, including the stacking of penalties that can now occur when taxpayers are engaged in
listed or tax haven transactions. Stuart M. Lewis, White Paper on Tax Penalty Reform, 2009 TAX
NOTES TODAY 75-25. Moreover, in June of 2009, Congress asked the IRS to suspend its enforcement of
the harsh § 6707A $200,000 strict liability penalty for nondisclosure, believing that it was too punitive
and excessive with respect to the small-business owners against whom it was being assessed. The IRS
complied and acknowledged that in many cases the penalty was disproportionate to the tax savings.
Douglas Shulman, Letter by IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 128-15.
39. Doran, supra note 3, 126–27.
40. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
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II. TESTING THE WATERS: IRS ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATIVE REGULATION
The concept of cooperative regulation is not entirely foreign to the
IRS. For a long time, the IRS has worked with taxpayers to resolve
certain issues, pre-filing through the private letter ruling (PLR) process.
During the last decade, several additional pre-filing programs, most
notably the pre-filing agreement (PFA) program and the Compliance
Assurance Program (CAP), have been put in place, which require
significant levels of taxpayer–IRS cooperation. 41 These programs,
although undoubtedly steps in the right direction, are currently too
limited in scope and application as they comprise only a small part of
the otherwise command-and-control centered regulatory tax regime.
Furthermore, as implemented these initiatives do not truly embrace
certain hallmarks of cooperative regulation, such as responsiveness,
inclusiveness, and trust.
A. Private Letter Rulings
Through the PLR process, a taxpayer desiring a written ruling from
the IRS regarding the tax status or effects of its transactions before filing
a return can submit a written inquiry and fee of up to $14,000 to the IRS
Associate Chief Counsel Office. 42 PLRs are then issued at the
discretion of the Service when they are deemed “appropriate in the
interest of sound tax administration.” 43 The IRS will interpret and apply
the applicable tax laws to the specific taxpayer’s set of facts. 44 Within
twenty-one days after a PLR request has been made, an IRS official will
meet with the taxpayer to inform him, if possible, whether the eventual
ruling will be favorable or adverse. 45 Once the process is complete, a
PLR is then issued and is authoritative with respect to that specific
taxpayer, assuming it adheres to the proposed form of transaction and
41. In 2001, the IRS also piloted the Fast Track Settlement (FTS) process, which is a nonbinding negotiation process between the taxpayer and revenue Agents or the Team Manager with the
assistance of an Appeals Official acting as a neutral third party. IRS Notice 2001-67, 2001-2 C.B. 544
(establishing pilot FTS program); Rev. Proc. 2003-40, 2003-1 C.B. 1044 (setting forth the procedures
for FTS). One of the most significant objectives of FTS is reducing the time it takes to resolve a dispute.
In many cases, the IRS has achieved this objective of appreciably shortening the time frame; given the
specified time limitation of 120 days from start to finish, in many cases taxpayers and the IRS have cut
two years or more from the resolution time. Pamela F. Olson & David B. Robison, Recently Developed
IRS Audit and Dispute Resolution Techniques, in TAX LAW & PRACTICE 841, 865 (PLI Tax Law &
Estate Planning Series, Course Handbook Series No. 855, 2008).
42. Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 2.01, app. A, 2010-1 I.R.B 1.
43. Id. § 2.01.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 8.02.
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there are no material changes in law. 46 All PLRs are then published in
redacted form and often serve as helpful guidance for other taxpayers,
although only the original taxpayer is entitled to rely on the ruling.47
There are significant limitations on the types of issues the IRS will
address through the PLR process. It will not issue letters where the
determination requested is primarily one of fact. 48 It will also not issue
a determination on the tax effect of a hypothetical or indefinite future
transaction. 49 Thus, the IRS generally issues a PLR on a proposed
transaction or on a completed transaction if the ruling request is
submitted before the return is filed for the year in which the transaction
is completed. 50 PLRs are also not issued with respect to any transaction
having a major purpose of reducing taxes. 51 The IRS generally will not
issue a PLR if the applicable law is unclear or unknown. 52 If the issue
cannot be readily resolved through the straightforward application of the
taxpayer’s facts to the tax statutes, regulations, or other published
guidance, generally no ruling will be issued. 53 In addition to these
limitations, the IRS has developed an extensive list of topics for which
they will not issue PLRs, including international issues. 54
Because of these limitations, many LBEs are unable to fully
maximize the potential afforded by the PLR process. LBEs generally
employ sophisticated in-house personnel who are able to handle
straightforward applications of existing law to facts. Pre-filing guidance
would be most useful to LBEs in situations where the applicable law is
unclear. Additionally, most LBEs are multinational and the exclusion of
most international issues also significantly limits the utility of the PLR
process. The reluctance of the IRS to tackle the more intricate issues
relevant to LBEs has garnered criticism. 55 In addition, the number of
PLRs issued by the Service has dropped from over 5,000 in 1980 to a
46. Id. § 11.01–.03.
47. Id. § 11.02; I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (West 2010).
48. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(s)(2) (as amended in 2002).
49. Id. § 601.201(d)(2); Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 6.12, 2010-1 I.R.B. 1.
50. Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 5.01, 2010-1 I.R.B. 1. Furthermore, the IRS will issue PLRs in all cases
when a prospective transaction is required by law to have a determination as to the tax consequences,
such as I.R.C. § 367 exchanges. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(d)(3).
51. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(s)(2).
52. Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 5.14, 2010-1 I.R.B. 1.
53. Id. § 6.09.
54. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(d)(2); Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 6.02, 2010-1 I.R.B. 1. In certain
situations, however, the IRS may issue a ruling in an area that it has said it would not ordinarily issue
one if there are unique and compelling reasons to do so. Rev. Proc. 2010-7, § 2.01, 2010-1 I.R.B. 231.
55. See, e.g., Michael Desmond, Resolution of Financial Products Tax Controversies, in TAX
LAW & PRACTICE 257, at 261 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Series, Course Handbook Series No.
860, 2009) (noting the scarcity of meaningful rulings in the financial products area).
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little under 2,000 in 2009. 56 A large portion of these rulings do not in
fact address substantive tax issues, but rather involve mundane taxpayer
requests to change accounting methods, obtain extensions, make election
modifications, or confirm qualification for tax-free transactions. 57
In addition to these PLR limitations, the publication of the decisions
is also a hurdle for LBEs. Although PLRs are redacted to preserve
anonymity when they are published, they still provide a detailed
description of the facts giving rise to the ruling. 58 This can be critical
because LBEs engage in many sensitive or proprietary transactions with
respect to which disclosure to the public, and in particular to their
competitors, would be untenable.
Thus, while the PLR process provides a potentially valuable resource
for LBEs and the IRS to resolve taxpayer issues pre-filing, the
limitations on the scope of issues involved and the public nature of the
process often make it a less than ideal solution for LBEs. As a result,
these restrictions are stifling the Service’s ability to get in front of,
versus merely reacting to, ongoing transactional and reporting issues that
taxpayers are facing. Unfortunately, similar deficiencies exist with the
Service’s more recently implemented PFA and CAP programs.
B. Pre-Filing Agreements
In 2000, the IRS started an alternative, pre-examination compliance
tool for Large and Midsize Business (LMSB) taxpayers known as the
PFA program. 59 The LMSB Division serves corporations, subchapter S
corporations, and partnerships with assets greater than $10 million. 60
The PFA program is available to all LMSB taxpayers who have
qualifying issues they would like resolved prior to filing their tax
returns. 61 Tax practitioners have hailed the use of PFAs as “superbly
efficient and beneficial for both taxpayers and the Service,” 62 and a
representative of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
56. Results yielded from search for PLRs issued during 1980 and 2009 on RIA/Checkpoint
database.
57. Id.
58. Rev. Proc. 2010-1, § 11.02, 2010-1 I.R.B. 1.
59. Rev. Proc. 2001-22, 2001-1 C.B. 745. On December 24, 2008, the IRS released Rev. Proc.
2009-14, which effectively made permanent some minor tweaks made to the program in 2007 (in Rev.
Proc. 2007-17) and some major changes made to the program in 2005 (in Rev. Proc. 2005-12). Rev.
Proc. 2009-14, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324.
60. IRS, Large & Mid-Size Business Division At-a-Glance, http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/
0,,id=96387,00.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
61. Rev. Proc. 2009-14, § 3.01, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324.
62. Amy S. Elliott, Practitioners Praise Prefiling Agreement Program, 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY
45-2.
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(AICPA) noted that it has “been a win-win both for the companies and
for the IRS, because it saves a lot on resources from both ends.” 63 Even
though many taxpayers and practitioners support the concept of the PFA
program, many criticize its less than ideal implementation. In particular,
critics blame the Service’s narrow program scope, conservative
implementation, heavy-handed Chief Counsel oversight, and aggressive
fee structure as significant detractors from the program’s potential
benefits. 64
1. Scope and Implementation
As a threshold matter, to qualify for the PFA program a taxpayer’s
request must relate to a transaction that is already complete and for
which the related return has not been filed. 65 PFAs cannot be used to
determine the tax treatment of prospective or future transactions or
events. 66 Moreover, PFAs are only used for issues that require either:
(1) a determination of facts or the application of well-established law to
known facts; or (2) an agreement as to the methodology used by a
taxpayer to determine the appropriate amount of an item of income,
allowance, deduction, or credit. 67 In addition, the PFA process is only
available with respect to a limited number of international issues. 68
For both domestic and international related issues, the Service may, in
its sole discretion, refuse to address an issue in a PFA based on
considerations of sound tax administration, and the program requires
LMSB to consult with the Office of Chief Counsel before any decision
is made to proceed with the taxpayer’s request for a PFA. 69 The Office
of Chief Counsel’s involvement has been a source of contention for
many taxpayers who feel that the Chief Counsel refuses many PFA
requests because they improperly infringe on its office’s territory.70
Whatever the reasoning, as demonstrated in Figure 2 below, the IRS has
indeed exercised its broad discretion to refuse PFA requests by rejecting
almost 35% of all applications.
63. Id. (quoting Benson S. Goldstein, a technical manager at AICPA).
64. Id.
65. Rev. Proc. 2009-14, § 1.02, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 3.03(1), (2).
68. Id. § 3.06.
69. Id. §§ 3.05, 3.06.
70. Id. § 3.06. See also Elliott, supra note 62, at 45-2 (citing both Daniel J. Wiles, a tax attorney
with PricewaterhouseCoopers and former lawyer in the Chief Counsel’s office, and Mike Dolan,
director in KPMG’s Washington National Tax Practice, as blaming the lack of Chief Counsel
concurrence as the reason that many of their PFA applications are not being accepted).
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Figure 2
IRS Pre-Filing Agreements 71
Received

Accepted

Closed with
Agreement

CY 2000

19

12

7

CY 2001

26

18

5

CY 2002

44

25

12

CY 2003

42

29

18

CY 2004

38

22

27

CY 2005

53

29

19

CY 2006

46

37

27

CY 2007

29

20

20

CY 2008

32

20

19

CY 2009

28

21

15

Total

357

233

169

Similar to the PLR process, one of the frustrations that the tax
community has with the existing PFA program is that the IRS is
reluctant to address any “real issues,” the type of which many
sophisticated LBE taxpayers would like resolved prior to filing. 72 Not
only do the present terms of the PFA limit their scope to the application
of well-settled law to known facts (a situation for which a PFA may
have only limited utility to an LBE), but the Service has also refused
otherwise eligible PFA issues because they were considered too
“controversial” in nature. 73 This reluctance to tackle difficult issues
severely limits the program’s utility to LBE taxpayers, particularly those
with well-staffed, sophisticated lawyers who are able to conduct difficult
analysis in areas where the law is well-settled. One of the major benefits
of the program, discussed further below in Part III.A, is that taxpayers
will be able to get certainty prior to filing, which not only saves them
money on penalty protection opinions and post-filing audit compliance
costs, but also allows them to book tax benefits immediately, rather than
creating reserves, under the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s

71. For the original statistics, see Pre-Fillment Agreement Program, http://www.irs.gov/
businesses/article/0,,id=102667,00.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2011).
72. Elliott, supra note 62, at 45-2 (quoting Daniel J. Wiles, a tax attorney with
PricewaterhouseCoopers).
73. Id.
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(FASB) Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48). 74 Despite the purported
potential benefits of this program, the IRS has accepted an average of
less than twenty-four PFA applications each year. 75
2. The Fee
In addition to the limited number of issues the IRS seems willing to
address through the PFA process, another reason the number of actual
applications is so low (an average of just over thirty-five per year) is that
there is a $50,000 user fee to participate in the PFA program. 76 The
justification for this fee is that even though the program saves the
Service money in the long-run, it is in fact a quite resource-intensive
endeavor in the short-term. 77 Prior to 2007, the IRS used a sliding scale
mechanism to calculate the fee, with the highest amount charged being
$10,000. This jump in fees has purportedly turned away many
midmarket LMSB taxpayers from the PFA program. This assertion is
consistent with the sudden drop-off in applications, illustrated in Figure
2 above, which occurred in 2007. 78 In addition, because all PFAs do not
result in a resolution (as of 2009, over a quarter of PFAs have failed to
result in a final agreement), smaller LMSB taxpayers may be even more
hesitant to invest a significant amount of capital upfront with no
assurances that the process will ultimately work out. Thus, under the
current PFA structure, the IRS has in place a program with significant
upside potential, but that offers pre-filing resolutions for less complex
issues that are of limited interest to larger taxpayers, at fee levels that
only larger taxpayers may be willing to bear.
C. Compliance Assurance Program
In December 2005, as a follow up to the PFA program, which
provides pre-filing resolution on an issue-by-issue basis, the IRS
announced CAP, which allows pre-filing reviews of multiple taxpayer

74. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48: ACCOUNTING FOR
UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES: AN INTERPRETATION OF FASB STATEMENT NO. 109, NO. 281-B
(2006) [hereinafter FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48], available at http://www.fasb.org/cs/
BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175820931560&blob
header=application/pdf.
75. See supra Figure 2.
76. Rev. Proc. 2009-14, § 10.02, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324.
77. Elliott, supra note 62, at 45.
78. Although, as discussed infra in Part IV.C, some of the drop off may be due to more taxpayers
moving into the CAP program.
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issues at a time. 79 CAP is a significant cooperation-based initiative in
which select large business taxpayers undergo “real-time” audits by
working closely with assigned IRS personnel such that taxpayers can
have certainty on all material issues prior to filing their tax returns. As
outlined in the CAP pilot announcement, the Service requires taxpayers
enrolled in the program to engage in “extensive cooperation,” which
includes “full disclosure of information concerning their completed
business transactions and their proposed return treatment of all material
issues.” 80 In return, successful participants in the program can minimize
or eliminate the need for any post-filing examinations or adjustments. 81
CAP has received primarily positive reviews during its inaugural
years. 82 However, the program has drawn criticism due to its limited
availability to only a handful of select taxpayers, its extensive
administrative demands, its time delays, and its sometimes antagonistic
implementations. 83
1. The CAP Process
When a taxpayer enters CAP, the Service will assign it an “Account
Coordinator.” 84 The Account Coordinator serves as the primary point of
contact with the Service for issue resolution. The Account Coordinator
reviews the taxpayer’s audit history and prior tax issues and becomes
familiar with relevant industry trends and current business practices of
the taxpayer. 85 During the initial stages of CAP, the Account
Coordinator works directly with the taxpayer to review business
transactions, assess risk, identify compliance issues, and provide
compliance guidance. During the review and examination of the
taxpayer’s compliance items, the Account Coordinator consults with
Service specialists, appeals personnel, and Chief Counsel advisors. 86
79. I.R.S. Ann. 2005-87, 2005-2 C.B. 1144 (Dec. 12, 2005).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, The Future of the CAP Program, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 55-3
(“IRS officials have touted the successes of the program and reported ‘overwhelmingly high’ customer
satisfaction with the process.”).
83. Id.
84. I.R.S. Ann. 2005-87, 2005-2 C.B. 1144 (Dec. 12, 2005).
85. Id. A standardized memorandum of understanding (MOU), which sets the ground rules for
CAP, must be executed between each participating taxpayer and the assigned Account Coordinator. The
MOU defines specific objectives for the program, sets parameters for the disclosure of information,
describes the methods of communication, and serves as a statement of the parties’ commitment to goodfaith participation in CAP. Failure to comply with the terms of the MOU may result in removal of the
taxpayer from the program. Id.
86. Id.
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CAP taxpayers that resolve all material issues with the Account
Coordinator will be assured, prior to the filing of the tax return, that the
IRS will accept their tax return, assuming it is filed consistent with all
agreed-to resolutions, and that no post-filing examination will be
required. 87 If all material issues cannot be resolved prior to the filing of
the return, the program will identify the remaining items that need to be
resolved through the traditional examination processes. 88 The taxpayer
will retain access to all available appeal rights with respect to any
traditional examination that is conducted. 89 CAP operates on a year-toyear basis and gives no promise of reducing or eliminating audit activity
in future years. 90 However, the number of CAP taxpayers that remain in
the program as repeat participants is steadily increasing. 91
2. Who Is in CAP?
CAP began as a pilot program with just seventeen hand-selected
taxpayers, all of which asked to continue in the program for future
cycles. 92 Today, there are nearly one hundred total taxpayers involved
in CAP. 93 Almost all of these participants are Coordinated Industry
Case (CIC) taxpayers, which means that they are large corporations
from specified industries that meet a composite of various quantitative
benchmarks (e.g., gross assets of at least $500 million; gross receipts of
at least $1 billion; foreign assets of at least $250 million) and are
regularly audited by LMSB examination teams. 94
A current significant limitation of CAP is that it is an invitation-only
program and is not open to all taxpayers. Only those companies that
historically have exhibited a “high level of tax compliance behavior” are
invited to participate in the program. 95 Practitioners have complained
that entry into the program needs to be greatly expanded and objective
criteria for selection should be established. 96 In order to counteract any
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Philip Tatarowicz et al., Internal Revenue Serv. Advisory Council, Large and Mid-Size
Business Subgroup Report (Nov. 19, 2008) [hereinafter LMSB Subgroup Report], available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/0,,id=188491,00.html#_Toc213566359.
91. Id.
92. Pamela F. Olson and David B. Robison, Recently Developed IRS Audit and Dispute
Resolution Techniques, in TAX LAW & PRACTICE 841, at 847 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning Series,
Course Handbook Series 855, 2008).
93. LMSB Subgroup Report, supra note 90.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Coder, supra note 82.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

19

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 4
H-HOLMES

1434

8/27/2011 5:09:08 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

perceived favoritisms, as the CAP program transitions out of its pilot
phase and demand escalates, a less subjective process will undoubtedly
need to be put in place.
3. The CAP Report Card
Overall, CAP participants have indicated that the ability to determine
certainty in their tax reporting and focus on current issues are the key
reasons they want to continue in the program. 97 However, there have
been a number of criticisms, particularly relating to actions of CAP
exam teams. Many of these concerns were brought forth in recent
interviews done by Tax Analysts with practitioners working with
taxpayer clients that are involved in CAP. 98 Not surprisingly, almost
none of the practitioners interviewed would do so on the record for fear
of potential adverse consequences for their clients. 99
Among the complaints lodged is an overall concern about the
continued antagonistic attitude of CAP participants from the IRS side,
including an undue focus on administrative procedures rather than
results. As noted by one practitioner: “Some CAP exam teams have not
embraced the concept behind the program and are still treating a CAP
exam like a traditional audit, issuing comprehensive [information
document requests] and such.” 100 Similarly, another practitioner
confessed that CAP “can be a very intrusive process, with the IRS exam
team digging into issues that may not be necessary.” 101 Other exam
teams have acted in ways that are so antithetical to the philosophy of
CAP that the participating taxpayers “have considered CAP to be
oppressive, without the expected sharing leading to a limited focus.” 102
Thus, in order to sustain on-going interest in CAP, the IRS will need to
ensure that its personnel buys into and demonstrates the cooperative
spirit that CAP is intended to foster.

97. Olson & Robison, supra note 92, at 899.
98. Coder, supra note 82.
99. Id.
100. Id. (the same practitioner also noting that “here is a frustration that the increased compliance
burden from reportable transaction reporting, Schedule M-3, and e-filing has done nothing to streamline
the examination process”).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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III. BENEFITS OF A COOPERATIVE APPROACH
The current regime of fines, penalties, and post-filing audits has
yielded no measurable improvement in tax compliance among large
corporations. 103 Indeed, over the past decade, although the statutory rate
has not changed, the effective corporate tax rate has declined, and the
general atmosphere of taxpayer–government hostility has risen with
each passing year. 104 As sophisticated taxpayers continue to outmaneuver the under-staffed government, Congress and the IRS have
repeatedly responded by instituting new, and more rigorous, deterrencefocused penalties and reporting requirements in an effort to stem the tide
of taxpayer non-compliance. These response tactics have targeted
taxpayers and tax advisors alike, and include increasing the penalties
applicable to tax shelters, 105 strengthening tax return preparer
liability, 106 greatly expanding the ethical rules governing tax practice,107
and forcing increased reporting and disclosure. 108
While the United States has continually struggled to make its
command-and-control regime adequately capture the income of LBEs,
in other jurisdictions, such as Australia, purposeful moves towards
cooperative regulation have actually yielded increased voluntary
103. See generally Thomas Barthold, Testimony of the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation Thomas A. Barthold Before the Select Revenue Measures Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Ways and Means Hearing on Taxes as Part of the Federal Budget, 2010 TAX NOTES
TODAY 56-47 (noting that over the years the percentage of corporate income tax revenues has declined).
104. Id.
105. See I.R.C. § 6700(a)(1)(B)(2)(B) (2006) (raising the shelter organizer penalty for a false
statement from $1,000 to 50% of gross income derived from the activity); I.R.C. § 6707 (2006)
(increasing the penalty for failure to register a tax shelter transaction from $500 to $50,000 for
reportable transactions other than listed transactions and up to 75% of gross income derived from the
activity for listed transactions); I.R.C. § 6707A (West 2010) (creating a new taxpayer penalty for failure
to disclose a reportable transaction); I.R.C. § 6708 (2006) (establishing a new penalty which replaced
the $50 penalty for failure to maintain investor lists under § 6112 with a $10,000 per day penalty for
failure to turn over information upon request from the IRS); I.R.C. § 6662A (West 2010) (creating a new
taxpayer 20% understatement penalty for reportable transactions, increased to 30% if not disclosed).
106. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3880
(codified at I.R.C. § 6694(a)(2)(A)–(B)).
107. Treasury Dep’t Circular No. 230, 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-10.93 (2007). See, e.g., Regulations
Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839, 75,844 (Dec. 20, 2004).
108. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6111-12, 6662A, 6707, 6707A. See also Treasury and IRS Issue Revised
Tax Form for Corporate Tax Returns, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 131-16 (noting that the IRS instituted a
book-tax reconciliation initiative which requires large corporations to file Schedule M-3, which is used
to reconcile their financial accounting net income to their taxable income and as an investigative tool for
ferreting out tax shelters). See also I.R.S. Ann. 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Jan. 26, 2010) (announcing a
new proposal that would require corporations with more than $10 million in assets to report the
maximum exposure they have for each “uncertain tax positions,” which primarily include those
positions for which a tax reserve must be established under FIN 48, on a new schedule to be filed with
their annual tax returns).
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compliance rates. 109 Such initiatives have focused on getting ahead of,
instead of responding, to emerging taxpayer issues, providing taxpayers
with helpful, readily available advice, assuring non-adversarial,
respectful treatment during audits, and creating positive incentives for
compliant taxpayers. 110 A shift towards a cooperative tax regime in the
United States could likewise yield significant benefits, including greater
accounting benefits for taxpayers, heightened awareness of tax
compliance norms, and decreased compliance costs for taxpayers and
the government.
A. Certainty Yields Benefits for FIN 48
A traditional post-filing examination of a taxpayer’s return takes an
average of fifty-two months to close. This is an extraordinarily long
time for a taxpayer to wait to gain certainty on their tax filing positions.
While in the past, this lag time for “closing the books” may have been
more palatable, recent accounting regulations have made LBEs subject
to FASB much less tolerable of contingent tax liabilities.
Under FIN 48, FASB now prohibits a company from booking a tax
benefit unless the tax position will more likely than not be sustained on
its merits. 111 Thus, in preparing financial statements, a company must
analyze each tax position and determine whether it meets the more likely
than not standard. If a position is unable to meet this threshold, the
company cannot book the benefit until the uncertainty is resolved, and
must disclose the position by showing a liability for the unrecognized
tax benefit. 112 A benefit failing the standard can only be subsequently
booked on the financial statements if the position is favorably resolved
with the IRS. 113
109. See, e.g., Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax
Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y 102, 106–08 (2007)
(arguing that respectful treatment by tax authorities leads to higher compliance, “particularly in [Swiss]
cantons using referendums and initiatives in political decision-making”); Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity
and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT 223, 246 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (concluding from data that “responsive service
and procedural fairness are positive incentives that affect normative commitments to tax compliance”).
110. Id. See also Michael Wenzel, Tax Compliance and the Psychology of Justice: Mapping the
Field, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 55 (reporting studies showing that taxpayers value
access to, and provision of, information by the Australian Tax Office).
111. FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48, supra note 74, ¶ 6 (“The more-likely-than-not recognition
threshold is a positive assertion that an enterprise believes it is entitled to the economic benefits
associated with a tax position. The determination of whether or not a tax position has met the morelikely-than-not recognition threshold shall consider the facts, circumstances, and information available
at the reporting date.”).
112. Id. ¶ 5.
113. Id. ¶ 3. A company may also subsequently book the benefits if there is a law change which
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Thus, under a cooperative approach, where a majority of major
taxpayer issues can be resolved pre-filing, 114 the benefits of immediate
certainty are concrete. 115 Taxpayers will be able to immediately book a
tax benefit on their financial statements, without reserve, if a favorable
determination on the issue is made during either the PFA or CAP
process. 116 The PFA process provides credible evidence of the value of
certainty to LBEs because taxpayers have been willing to pay $50,000 in
order to determine the outcome of a tax transaction in real-time rather
than waiting two or more years for a final determination. 117
B. Lower Compliance and Enforcement Costs
Pre-filing certainty of outcomes not only allows taxpayers to avoid
booking tax reserves, but it also saves both taxpayers and the IRS the
expenditure of significant amounts of time and money in anticipation of,
preparing for, and in the process of post-filing battle. IRS enforcement
costs, which have steadily increased over the past five years, include the
costs of conducting post-filing audits, contests, and litigation. 118 The
total number of IRS collection and enforcement personnel necessary to
execute these functions has grown 11% since 2005. 119
Likewise, LBEs spend millions of dollars annually complying with
and subsequently defending their reporting positions with respect to the
tax laws. 120 The overwhelming complexity of the tax rules can result in
extremely high compliance costs for LBE taxpayers, even if they are

pushes the likelihood of success over the 50% threshold or the statute of limitations applicable to the
position lapses such that no further adjustments can be made. Id.
114. For example, a CAP case only takes an average of 6.3 months to close. Sam Young, Current
Information Key to Good Tax Administration, IRS Official Says, 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY 211-8.
115. See I.R.S. Ann. 2005-87, 2005-2 C.B. 1144 (“CAP will allow taxpayers to better manage tax
reserves and ensure more precise reporting of earnings on financial statements.”). See also Elliott, supra
note 62, at 45.
116. Olson & Robison, supra note 92, at 865.
117. Rev. Proc. 2009-14, § 10.02, 2009-3 I.R.B. 324.
118. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REPT. NO 2010-30-066, TRENDS IN
COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2009 (2010) [hereinafter TIGT FY2009 COMPLIANCE
REPORT].
119. Id.
120. For example, Jim Owens, Chairman and CEO of Caterpillar, Inc., stated that “tax makes a
substantial difference in U.S. competitiveness,” and he specifically was troubled by the complexity of a
tax system that results in Caterpillar spending $40 million annually on tax planning, preparation, and
filing. James W. Owens, Chairman & CEO, Caterpillar, Inc., Panelist at Secretary Henry M. Paulson’s
Conference on U.S. Business Tax Competitiveness (July 26, 2007). In addition, Mobil Oil reported that
completing and filing its 1993 federal income tax return cost $10 million and that the return was 6,300
pages long. See Dennis R. Lassila & L. Murphy Smith, Tax Complexity and Compliance Costs of U.S.
Multinational Corporations, 10 ADVANCES IN INT’L ACCT. 207, 209 (1997).
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merely trying to comply with—and not manipulate—the laws. 121 The
U.S. tax system is estimated to impose a hidden compliance cost on all
taxpayers of over $260 billion each year. 122 This does not include the
countless dollars spent by LBEs on tax planning in and around these
rules, which may include pricy penalty protection opinions issued by
their outside tax counsel. National Taxpayers Union estimates that the
cost for compliance by corporations is almost $160 billion, which
comprises over 50% of corporate income taxes collected in FY 2008. 123
To be sure, although many dollars are spent in mere efforts to comply
with the laws, additional costs borne by LBEs are done so based on the
ex ante calculus of weighing incremental tax planning costs against the
anticipated tax savings. Nevertheless, even LBEs would be willing to
trade a slightly higher effective tax rate to the extent they could realize a
commiserate decrease in tax compliance costs. Even if the net tax costs
remained unchanged as a result of a cooperative regime (i.e., the
decrease in compliance costs exactly offset the increase in taxes paid),
LBEs would still realize the additional benefits of increased certainty
and the ability to allocate post-filing compliance time to more
productive efforts.
Accordingly, if the IRS and LBEs are able to work through a majority
of their unresolved issues pre-filing, significant cost and time savings
could accrue to both sides. As noted by the IRS: “Taxpayers and the
Service often resolve issues more effectively and efficiently through a
pre-filing examination than a post-filing examination, because the
taxpayer and the Service have more timely access to the records and
personnel that are relevant to the issues.” 124 These pre-filing procedures
thus benefit both taxpayers and the government by improving the quality
of tax compliance while reducing costs, burdens, and delays. The IRS
recently conducted a time and cost expenditure analysis with respect to
its PFA program, and found that on average, the Service benefited from
an estimated 80% cost savings compared with resolving the same issue

121. Lassila & Smith, supra note 120, at 209–10.
122. J. SCOTT MOODY ET AL., TAX FOUND., SPECIAL REPORT: THE RISING COST OF COMPLYING
WITH THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1 (2005), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/sr138.pdf.
This creates an extraordinary amount of social waste and also can result in lower profits for LBEs,
higher prices of goods and services for customers, and decreased amounts of capital available for
domestic and foreign investment. Robert J. Peroni et al., Reform and Simplification of the U.S. Foreign
Tax Credit Rules, 101 TAX NOTES 103, 105–06 (2003).
123. David Keating, A Taxing Trend: The Rise in Complexity, Forms, and Paperwork Burdens,
NAT’L TAXPAYERS UNION: POLICY PAPERS, Apr. 15, 2009, at 5, available at http://www.ntu.org/
assets/pdf/policy-papers/pp_ntu_126.pdf (calculated using estimates of the total paperwork burden for
corporate income taxes multiplied by the hourly wage for tax accountants).
124. Elliott, supra note 62.
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post-filing. 125 Similarly, taxpayers experienced an average estimated
60% cost savings from the program. 126 These cost reductions are
substantial and support the tangible benefits that can accrue on both
sides from increased cooperation. Even if these savings estimates do not
reflect all of the real costs that will be associated with a more
widespread change in processes, they demonstrate the savings that can
be achieved through a more cooperative approach that focuses on prefiling resolutions.
C. Institutional Knowledge Gains from Increased Transparency
Cooperative regulation can also help the IRS gain institutional
knowledge which will help it become more efficient in performing its
existing regulatory duties, such as drafting regulations, issuing timely
guidance, and enforcing taxpayer compliance. One of the biggest
obstacles to effective enforcement at the IRS is the vast information
asymmetry that often exists between taxpayers and the Service. 127
There are certainly intermediaries and other agencies that have their own
withholding and disclosure duties and serve as a backstop to the
Service’s otherwise self-reporting system. 128 Nevertheless, taxpayers
largely control the flow of information to the IRS. If the taxpayer has
critical information that the IRS wants to know, they are typically the
only party in the position to provide it. This is particularly problematic
because tax results can turn on even the smallest of facts, and accurate,
complete information is often necessary to calculate a taxpayer’s “true”
tax liability.
Today, a large bulk of the Service’s knowledge regarding taxpayer
behaviors is gleaned from post-filing reviews of taxpayer returns.
Unfortunately, taxpayers know where to hide items on their tax returns

125. Id. See also Prepared Remarks of IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman to the New York State
Bar Association Taxation Section Annual Meeting in New York City, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 17-15
(“Today, we spend up to 25 percent of our time in a large corporate audit searching for issues rather than
having a straightforward discussion with the taxpayer about the issues. It would add efficiency to the
process if we had access to more complete information earlier in the process regarding the nature and
materiality of a taxpayer’s uncertain tax positions.”).
126. Elliott, supra note 62.
127. See generally Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When
Is Information Reporting Warranted, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1734 (2010) (“One aspect of the
problem is that the taxpayer knows the facts regarding the relevant transactions he or she engaged in
during the tax year—or at least has ready access to that information. The government is forced to obtain
that information after the fact, either from the taxpayer or from third parties.”).
128. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1441 (2006) (requiring tax to be withheld at source on interest, dividends,
and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical U.S. source income paid to foreign persons); FASB
INTERPRETATION NO. 48, supra note 74.
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and how to befuddle the IRS examiners. 129 Field agents may have an
almost impossible time trying to reverse-engineer complex transactions
that involve multiple entities, jurisdictions, and flows of income and
deductions. Initiatives such as the PFA and CAP programs, however,
which require a certain amount of real-time collaboration with IRS
officials, will allow the Service to become aware of and respond more
quickly to emerging issues which they may not otherwise have known
about or become aware of. This will facilitate the government’s
transition from a primarily reactive to a primarily responsive regulatory
posture. 130
Greater institutional knowledge can significantly improve the
effectiveness of the IRS in its dealings with taxpayers. If certain tax
planning techniques or structures are on the rise and the IRS becomes
aware of them during the course of its pre-filing efforts with cooperating
taxpayers, it will then be better equipped to address any tax treatment
uncertainties in a responsive, rather than reactionary way. Making the
Service’s institutional knowledge more current with respect to emerging
tax issues will enable it to take any number of responsive actions. These
actions may include working directly with affected taxpayers in realtime to determine the most appropriate tax treatment, issuing clarifying
or preemptive guidance to the extent the applicable law is unclear, or
educating field agents of more pertinent issues to be focused on during
taxpayer examinations. As a regulating body, the IRS can only improve
its enforcement efforts if it is more aware of what its regulatees are
actually doing.
D. Heightened Awareness of Tax Compliance Norms
Although the Service’s increased knowledge may increase its power
as a regulator, an LBE’s pre-filing collaboration with the IRS does not
have to result in a “heads we win, tails you lose” game with the Service.
Active communication between taxpayers and tax authorities can be a
crucial component to forging a shared understanding of tax compliance

129. See generally Raskolnikov, supra note 9, at 582; Schizer, supra note 5, at 335 (noting that
complex tax structures can be arranged to “have extraneous pieces that are included solely to befuddle
auditors” and when “[f]acing a large and complicated return, auditors try to intuit what questions to ask,
without really knowing where the bodies are buried”).
130. As noted by Daniel Shaviro, “[t]here are simply too many fault lines in the existing income
tax laws and too many clever people laboring behind closed doors to find new ways to exploit these fault
lines for after-the-fact prospective responses to be adequate.” DANIEL SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX
SHELTERS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: WHY THEY ARE A PROBLEM AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 23
(2004).
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norms and can yield benefits to both sides. 131
Ambiguity in either the applicability or content of the law can cause
difficulties for LBEs and the Service alike in terms of increased time and
money spent, even in attempts to merely comply with (as opposed to
game) the tax system. Ambiguity is not uncommon in today’s everchanging environment where legitimate transactions are becoming
increasingly globalized and investment technologies are becoming more
sophisticated. It is impossible for the existing tax rules to stay in
complete lockstep with the evolving landscape, and there will often be
lag time between the emergence of new market technologies and the tax
law that will govern them.
Having a meeting of the minds between taxpayers and IRS officials as
these issues arise, however, can help ameliorate these effects. Absent
such dialogue, the parties “may have different and genuinely held
understandings of a rule’s meaning, and may each consider theirs the
correct and clear” application of the law. 132 Active communication
between the parties can identify a shared compliance norm and clarify
what is expected of each participant. Moreover, understanding the
opposing party’s point of view and decision-making processes can help
forge a better understanding of not only where the law is, but also how
the law should evolve.
E. Lessons from Down Under: The Australian Experience
In 1997, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) developed a
cooperative compliance model in consultation with its Cash Economy
Taskforce. 133 Built on core goals such as understanding taxpayer
behavior, building a cooperative relationship with the taxpayer
community, and encouraging support and compliance, the model put in
place several normative goals, including: (1) advocating taxpayer
assistance, rather than abuse, when taxpayers make mistakes through
131. McBarnet, TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 276.
132. Sol Picciotto, Constructing Compliance: Game Playing, Tax Law, and the Regulatory State,
29 LAW & POL’Y 11, 12 (2007). See also McBarnet, TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 276
(observing whether a taxpayer “does what is asked of him or her is not always visible,” and “whether or
not a person interprets the request in accordance with its intent is sometimes far from certain”).
133. New Zealand has also moved towards a cooperative approach. In 2001, the newly appointed
New Zealand Inland Revenue Commissioner through the department’s strategic document “The Way
Forward,” and in 2002 with a training program for operative staff. “The Way Forward” outlined four
strategic strands: (1) streamline and simplify tax processes; (2) create an environment which promotes
compliance; (3) enhance staff capability; and (4) enhance the administration of social policy business. A
compliance model, adapted from the ATO compliance model, formalized the department’s ideas for
moving from a traditional deterrence-based approach to a more responsive regulatory system. Job et al.,
supra note 11, at 91.
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ignorance or poor financial planning and are prepared to come forward
with full disclosure; (2) providing assistance to “put things right and
move on” if taxpayers are prepared to be cooperative when anomalies
are spotted; and (3) dedicating resources to focus persistent and
consistent attention on the difficult cases and the “big fish,” not the “low
hanging fruit.” 134 To fulfill these goals, Australian revenue agents were
instructed to abandon their previously contentious ways and adopt a
softer, more cooperative approach with taxpayers. 135 In fact, the
principles of responsive regulation were incorporated into corporate
plans, training packages for newcomers to the ATO, staff performance
assessments, recruitment selection criteria, legislation, and in the day-today operations of the field staff. 136
The ATO compliance model relies on the idea that taxpayers’ beliefs,
values, and attitudes concerning the tax administration lead them to
adopt a particular stance towards the tax administration. 137 Depending
on the taxpayers’ beliefs, the tax administration uses various techniques
to achieve taxpayer cooperation. The model resembles a pyramid in
which it is assumed that most taxpayers are cooperative and are
therefore at the bottom. 138 The tax administration initially appeals to the
social responsibility of the taxpayer and aims to cultivate the taxpayer’s
good citizenship, trust, and alliance without the use of punitive measures
that could undermine the taxpayer’s goodwill and intrinsic motivation to
comply. 139 If the taxpayer does not comply, then the tax administration
moves proportionally higher on the pyramid and uses more authoritarian
means of enforcement, regulation, and punitive consequences.
However, the administration is also forgiving. As soon as the taxpayer
chooses cooperation, the tax administration will gradually move down
the pyramid, de-escalating enforcement and regulation. 140 Therefore,
the taxpayer views the tax administration as cooperative unless they
refuse to comply, and then more command-and-control techniques are
used. The belief is that a system which is responsive to the attitudes of
the specific taxpayer will more adequately reign in non-compliant
taxpayers, while sparing the compliant taxpayers from unnecessary
tension with and fear of the tax administration.
To be sure, Australia’s transition has not been easy. Within the ATO,
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 90.
See Raskolnikov, supra note 12, at 737.
Job et al., supra note 11, at 90.
Leviner, supra note 21, at 410.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 422.
Id.
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the new model created significant organizational barriers. ATO is a
large bureaucracy, with about 19,000 people on staff split into twelve
divisions dispersed throughout the country. 141 Many of the staff,
particularly those individuals that had been with the ATO for a long time
and were entrenched in the old culture, had difficulty adjusting to the
new system. 142 Obstacles faced by ATO included difficulties in
infiltrating the new vision across the entire agency and getting the staff
to adjust to their new tasks in the new system. 143 Indeed some staff
members in certain positions believed that their jobs were being
compromised by the new regime and were reluctant to follow the
changes. 144 These cultural and workforce adjustments were particularly
hard given the historically anti-innovative culture of the ATO. 145
However, initial results indicate that the difficulties have been well
worth the benefits which have accrued under the cooperative regime.
According to the ATO, these benefits have been significant. For
example, the ATO has realized increases in revenue collections and
decreases in deductions and losses claimed by high-net worth individual
taxpayers. 146 It claims to also have achieved significant results in terms
of increased revenue in dealing with transfer pricing issues. 147 Every
Aus$1 million dollars spent by the ATO resulted in over Aus$1 billion
extra tax collected. 148 The ATO believes these outcomes are even more
meaningful because they are related to highly sophisticated taxpayers,
most of whom historically have been able to choose how much tax they
wanted to pay because of their high capacity to use tax avoidance
mechanisms that were relatively safe from ATO enforcement and
surveillance activity. 149
While at first blush these results may seem extraordinary, they have
come as a result of years of comprehensive and painstaking efforts to
overhaul the entire model and culture of taxation in Australia.
Considerable resources are needed to transform a tax system.
Entrenchment difficulties with respect to enforcement attitudes and
systems would be at least as arduous in the United States, if not more so.
Additionally, because the Australian system is still fairly new, there is
141. Jenny Job & David Honaker, Short-Term Experience with Responsive Regulation in the
Australian Taxation Office, in TAXING DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 118–20.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 118–20.
144. Id. at 120–23.
145. Id.
146. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE (2005).
147. Id. at 95.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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no firm statistical data to highlight which of tools and reform measures
best encourage compliance. Nevertheless, the ATO reform has thus far
demonstrated that the potential for sustained, improved taxpayer
compliance is real and is worthy of serious examination in the U.S. tax
regime.
IV. FORCING COOPERATION
If the Service wanted to leverage Australia’s seemingly successful
experiment and try to realize the benefits of a cooperative regulatory
approach, how could it shift the U.S. taxing culture away from its
current deterrence-based paradigm? A long-standing mistrust has settled
in between LBEs and the government, making such a transition difficult
to implement. Moreover, although internal cultural and resource
challenges at the Service may also hinder transition, the attitudes and
behaviors of the LBEs may pose the most difficult hurdle to overcome.
Because many LBEs believe that they are defeating the IRS in the tax
war, they may not have the incentive to move into a cooperation-based
program without a clear impetus to do so. In this regard, this Article
argues that a fundamental change must be made to the current LBE
compliance calculus. Although LBEs are aware of the benefits they may
achieve through a cooperative regime, including certainty and
potentially lower compliance costs, they may not be willing to make a
move that could potentially put them in a worse economic position. As
illustrated in Figure 3 below, LBEs could be unsure as to whether they
would end up in cooperative state A, in which the new regime would
enable them to reap the expected benefits of cooperation because the
uptick in actual taxes paid to the U.S. fisc would be outweighed by
lower tax planning and compliance costs, or cooperative state B, in
which the IRS would take advantage of its more open access to taxpayer
information to significantly augment tax liabilities.
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Figure 3 150
Hypothetical LBE Taxpayer
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Given many LBEs’ past dealings with the IRS, they may have no
reason to trust that the IRS would not use any tools at their disposal to
drive up their ultimate tax costs. Under the current tax regime, many
LBEs are hesitant to pursue pre-filing resolutions, even when they have
the opportunity and incentives to do so. Notwithstanding their growing
needs for certainty in reporting positions, LBEs seem reluctant to bring
to the attention of the IRS transactions with uncertain tax consequences
which may not otherwise be noticed upon audit because the risk of
negative IRS interference is too high. 151 Therefore, because the IRS
may have a hard time getting LBEs to buy into a new cooperative
strategy, they will likely have to meaningfully change tax compliance
norms.
In this regard, the IRS will likely have to delineate sharper
compliance choices for taxpayers by broadening the spectrum of
applicable compliance standards. Similar to the strategy employed by
the ATO, the system should be designed such that non-cooperation
would be met with larger “sticks,” such as heightened penalties, while
full cooperation would be met with juicier “carrots,” such as expanded

150. This graph is illustrative only. The black bar represents the taxpayer’s total tax planning and
compliance costs. The white bar represents the total amount of tax paid to the U.S. government. The
gray bar represents the sum of the black and white bars, which equals the taxpayer’s total tax cost.
151. Yehonatan Givati, Resolving Legal Uncertainty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Advance Tax
Rulings, 29 VA. TAX REV. 137, 137 (2009) (finding “[t]he strategic disadvantages of applying for an
advance ruling usually outweigh the strategic advantages of such a request” in part because application
for advance rulings dramatically increase the probability of IRS inspection and detection of otherwise
borderline transactions which may not be detected upon audit).
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pre-filing programs, lower penalty rates, and lower compliance costs. 152
When faced with the two options, rational LBE taxpayers should, over
time, end up on the side of cooperation. Moreover, by widening the gap
between the two enforcement regimes, taxpayers would be forced to
signal their cooperative intentions to the IRS.
If successfully
implemented, the Service could then dynamically use this signaling
information to make its post-filing efforts more effective and “force”
more taxpayers onto the path of cooperation.
A. Higher Penalty and Legality Standards
In order to change the status quo in a way that will induce taxpayers
to participate in the Service’s expanded pre-filing programs, the liability
and legality standards for LBEs will need to be raised. Under the
present system, taxpayers are faced with relatively low penalty rates that
are subject to easily invoked defenses. 153 This Article proposes that all
LBE taxpayers who are eligible for pre-filing assistance through the
CAP and PFA programs be subject to a strict liability standard.
Moreover, the actual standard of legality, and thereby the benchmark for
penalties, should also be raised to “more likely than not,” regardless of
whether the position is disclosed on the return. When faced with the
reality of certain penalties if they “get it wrong,” LBE taxpayers should
respond by increasing their efforts to “get it right.” This assurance can
be achieved by working with the IRS pre-filing in order to resolve all
material questions related to their returns. If taxpayers do choose to go
it alone, they should be less aggressive in their reporting positions in
order to avoid being assessed penalties. In either case, compliance
among LBE taxpayers should increase.
1. Current Penalty Regime
Taxpayers engaged in non-reportable or non-tax-shelter transactions
are generally subject to a 20% accuracy-related penalty on
underpayments of tax that are due to negligence or disregard of the rules

152. See generally Ventry, supra note 11, at 436 (also supporting the use of “sweeter carrots and
sharper sticks”).
153. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (West 2010). In addition, penalties can be avoided if the taxpayer can
show that they acted with reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to their underpayment. I.R.C.
§ 6664(c)(1) (West 2010). The taxpayer has the burden of proof regarding reasonable cause and good
faith and this exception is generally geared towards taxpayers having honest misunderstandings of law
or who make inadvertent computational or transcription errors. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as
amended in 2003).
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or to understatements that are “substantial.” 154 The penalty increases to
40% if the underpayment is the result of a gross valuation
misstatement. 155 These penalties, however, generally can be avoided
with respect to an undisclosed position if the taxpayer has “substantial
authority” or with respect to a disclosed position if it has a “reasonable
basis.” 156 The penalty rate is increased to 40% if the taxpayer fails to
adequately disclose the relevant facts affecting the tax treatment in the
return. 157 Thus, if a taxpayer properly discloses his position, he will not
be subject to the accuracy-related penalty so long as he has a reasonable
basis for his reporting position. 158 This reasonable basis standard has
been interpreted by the government and the practicing tax bar to equate
to a tax reporting position that has just a 20% chance of prevailing on
the merits. 159 Accordingly, as long as a taxpayer files a de minimis
amount of factual information with his return, he can make his tax
payments based on positions that have only a one-in-five chance of
being the correct position.
If a taxpayer does not disclose his position related to the
understatement, then penalties will be assessed if the position cannot be
supported by substantial authority. 160
Substantial authority is
established if “the weight of the authorities supporting the treatment is
substantial in relation to the weight of authorities supporting contrary

154. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1)–(5). For corporate taxpayers an understatement is substantial if the
amount of the understatement exceeds the lesser of (a) 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return
for that tax year (or $10,000 if that is greater), or (b) $10 million. Id. § 6662(d)(1)(B). A taxpayer will
have to reach a higher standard of certainty with respect to his disclosed positions to avoid penalties
with respect to his tax understatements if the underlying transactions are “reportable transactions” or
“tax shelters.” In these cases, the 20% penalty is not imposed if the position is properly disclosed, is
backed by substantial authority, and the taxpayer reasonably believes that his tax treatment is more
likely than not the proper treatment (i.e., greater than 50%). I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2). If the disclosure is not
provided, the penalty will be raised to 30% and the reasonable belief defense, discussed below, will not
be available. I.R.C. § 6662A(c) (West 2010).
155. I.R.C. § 6662(h)(1). In addition, for underpayments attributable to transactions entered into
after March 30, 2010, a 20% penalty applies to an underpayment attributable to any disallowance of
claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction lacking economic substance or failing to meet the
requirements of any similar rule of law. Id. § 6662(b)(6).
156. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
157. I.R.C. § 6662(i)(1).
158. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii). A taxpayer properly discloses his position if he files a completed
Form 8275 or 8275-R with his return. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(f); Rev. Proc. 2010-15, 2010-7 I.R.B.
404.
159. STAFF ON THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, STUDY OF PRESENT-LAW PENALTY AND
INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ACT OF
1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) 152 (Comm. Print 1999)
[hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE PENALTY STUDY].
160. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i).
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treatment.” 161 This position has been interpreted as requiring a taxpayer
to have about a 40% chance of prevailing on the merits. 162
Both the accuracy related and substantial understatement penalties
can be avoided, however, if the taxpayer can show that he acted with
reasonable cause and in good faith with respect to his underpayment. 163
In all cases, the taxpayer has the burden of proof regarding reasonable
cause and good faith, and the most important factor is the extent of the
taxpayer’s efforts to ascertain its true tax liability. 164 In this regard, a
taxpayer may rely on professional advice, including an opinion of
counsel, so long as such reliance was reasonable and the taxpayer acted
in good faith. 165
2. Moving to Strict Liability and Higher Reporting Standard
Because the current regime allows LBEs to easily escape penalties as
long as they have a reasonable basis for their reporting position and they
rely on a tax advisor, LBEs are able to consistently underpay their true
tax liability. According to the IRS, the true tax liability of a taxpayer is
“the amount of tax that would be determined for the tax year in question
if all relevant aspects of the tax law were correctly applied to all of the
relevant facts of that taxpayer’s situation.” 166
Non-compliance
purportedly occurs when the taxpayer does not pay her true tax liability
voluntarily and timely. 167 Presumably, to be correct, a position must
have at least a greater than 50% chance of being sustained on its merits,
or in other words, more likely than not to be sustained on its merits.
If this is the standard of tax legality as perceived by the government,
then it is difficult to reconcile this correctness standard with the
standards applicable to taxpayers to avoid penalties on their tax returns,

161. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3).
162. See JOINT COMMITTEE PENALTY STUDY, supra note 159, at 152.
163. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (West 2010).
164. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2003).
165. Id. A taxpayer’s reliance on a tax opinion would not be reasonable, for example, to the
extent the opinion did not properly take into account all of the taxpayer’s relevant facts and
circumstances. Id. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(i). The tax advisor’s opinion may not be relied upon to establish
the reasonable belief of a taxpayer, however, if the tax advisor is a disqualified tax advisor. I.R.C.
§ 6664(d)(3)(B) (providing that an advisor is disqualified if it is (i) a material advisor or compensated by
the material advisor, (ii) has a contingency fee based on the intended tax benefits of the transaction at
issue, or (iii) has a disqualified financial interest in the transaction). The opinion must also not rely on
any unreasonable assumptions or the invalidity of a regulation. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(ii), (iii).
See also I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(B)(iii).
166. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REDUCING THE
FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 6 (2007) (emphasis added).
167. Id.
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which only require the reporting of a disclosed return position that has a
one-in-five chance of succeeding on its merits. 168 Even if an LBE’s
reporting position is later challenged by IRS officials, in the worst case
scenario the taxpayer’s treatment will be disallowed, and they will have
to return the tax benefit to the IRS with appropriate interest. 169 Other
than possibly making it difficult to book a tax benefit for accounting
purposes, this makes the ex ante risk of taxpayer aggression (at least
down to the 20% reasonable basis threshold) near zero. Accordingly,
under the current penalty regime, a taxpayer is under no duty to report
items on his tax return, with or without any additional disclosures, in a
manner he believes reflects the correct amount of tax he should pay
under the applicable tax rules and regulations.
If LBEs only need to have a 20% confidence level in their reporting
positions, it is not surprising that they are not taking more advantage of
the pre-filing resolution programs currently offered by the Service.
Taxpayers would need another overriding concern to seek pre-filing
assistance, such as the booking of tax benefits for financial accounting
reporting purposes because they should otherwise be able to achieve the
meager required reporting standard without IRS input. Accordingly, in
order to move LBEs into these cooperative programs, the liability
standards should be raised.
In particular, LBEs should be subject to a strict liability standard with
respect to: (1) all of their return positions if they are eligible to
participate in CAP; and (2) all transactions which are eligible for
resolution through the PFA process. 170 If the LBE underreports, its tax
liability in either of these situations, then penalties should be enforced
regardless of reasonableness, good faith, or disclosure, if their reporting
positions are not more likely than not the correct position. 171 LBE
taxpayers are sophisticated enough to be held responsible for calculating

168. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
169. I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6621(a)(2) (2006).
170. While a transaction’s eligibility for PFA resolution should trigger the strict liability standard,
imposing that requirement on PLR eligible transactions may not be equitable, particularly with respect
to sensitive or proprietary transactions. Even though the opinions are redacted, a full statement of facts,
including details of the transaction structure, are included. If the issue at hand does not implicate
privacy concerns, however, a heightened standard for PLR eligible issues may also be warranted.
171. The disclosure distinction should not bear on the assessment of penalties because many LBEs
are adept at reporting positions in such a way where the probability of detection is not meaningfully
increased. See generally Ventry, supra note 11, at 451–52 (supporting the imposition of no-fault
penalties to reduce the gamesmanship of the current soft penalty regime); Daniel Shaviro, Disclosure
and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters 45 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 07-05, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=955354 (stating that “no-fault” penalties should not even be controversial
because of taxpayers gaming of uncertainty in the law).
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their actual tax liabilities, particularly when assistance is available,
without violating any equity or fairness principles. 172 Indeed, many
LBEs are already subject to the more likely than not standard for their
reporting of tax positions under FASB and already have to analyze each
of their material tax positions and determine whether they meet this
standard. 173 Accordingly, if a taxpayer has the option of seeking prefiling resolution of an uncertain tax position, they should be strictly
liable for penalties if they choose to forgo assistance and fail to correctly
report their tax liability.
B. Sweetening the Benefits of Cooperation
While non-cooperators should be subject to more stringent
enforcement, cooperators should be rewarded with more favorable rules
and other benefits. If LBEs choose to seek pre-filing assistance rather
than be subject to strict liability, then the Service needs to have
procedures and controls in place which ensure that they are met with
respect and non-adversarial assistance. If the IRS continues to employ a
heavy handed, mistrustful, and threatening “gotcha” enforcement
attitude, then LBEs, even in the face of strict liability, may choose to
take their chances and go it alone. They would be legitimately
concerned as to what the IRS would do with open access to their taxrelated records. Rather, as soon as a taxpayer signals that they are
willing to be cooperators, the IRS needs to meet them halfway and work
towards a cooperative resolution. Moreover, in order to keep LBEs on
the cooperative path, a proven record of cooperation and compliance
should be further rewarded.
1. Expansion of Pre-Filing Assistance
In order to be able to truly capitalize on the benefits of cooperative
regulation, it is important for LBEs to be able to get certainty with

172. The bar and tax regulators have clung to standards below the 50% level based on two
misguided premises: (i) it is impossible to correctly determine one’s tax liability in all situations; and (ii)
the tax return is an adversarial document. See Rachelle Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185, 212–17 (2010). Moreover, LBEs can take advantage of tax risk or indemnity
insurance policies which protect them for disallowed tax benefits. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law
Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV., 339, 387–95 (2006).
173. FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 48, supra note 74, ¶ 6 (“The more-likely-than-not recognition
threshold is a positive assertion that an enterprise believes it is entitled to the economic benefits
associated with a tax position. The determination of whether or not a tax position has met the morelikely-than-not recognition threshold shall consider the facts, circumstances, and information available
at the reporting date.”).
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respect to as many of their material tax issues as possible before filing
the return. As outlined above, however, the current PLR, PFA, and CAP
programs only capture a very small portion of LBE taxpayers. PLRs are
only issued under certain conditions and the results are publicly
disclosed, albeit on a no-names basis. In addition, the IRS only takes on
a limited number of PFAs each year. 174 CAP is a by-invitation-only
program with only one hundred participants. 175 Accordingly, these
programs would have to be expanded well beyond their present scope in
order to maximize the potential payoffs of the responsive regulation
model. In addition, informal ad hoc advice should be more readily
available and perhaps even serve as a reasonable defense to the strict
liability standard.
With just over 20,000 total enforcement officers and agents, 176 the
IRS cannot realistically open up CAP to all of its roughly 20,000 LBE
taxpayers. 177 It would have to roll out the program gradually. Initial
expansion among public companies makes the most sense because these
companies are already involved in real-time assessments of their
outstanding material tax issues in order to comply with their quarterly
FIN 48 reporting requirements. It also makes sense to transition
resources that are currently being used for post-filing audits to pre-filing
resolutions. Eventually, however, CAP should be available to as many
of the top quartile of LBE taxpayers as possible or whatever number the
IRS determines constitutes a majority of its LBE tax revenues. Broad
availability is particularly important if the Service wants to capitalize on
the sorting and signaling benefits provided by an opt-in cooperative
regime, discussed below in Part IV.C. For those taxpayers for which
CAP is not feasible or practical, PFAs and PLRs should be made more
widely available. The IRS should lift many of the limitations it
currently has in place, including restrictions on international transactions
and controversial questions of law, and allow taxpayers to have a quick
and cooperative means for which to settle one-off tax issues pre-filing.
Outside of the official pre-filing avenues, pre-filing communication
with the IRS can be counterproductive, as unofficial or informal IRS
174. See supra Figure 2.
175. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
176. IRS FY 2009 RESULTS, supra note 24.
177. This number is an estimate based on the number of tax returns filed by C corporations,
partnerships, and S corporations with reported assets of $250 million or greater (14,673, 4,375 and 660,
respectively). Id. (reporting FY 2009 return numbers for C corporations); TREASURY INSPECTOR
GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, FILING CHARACTERISTICS AND EXAMINATION RESULTS FOR
PARTNERSHIPS AND S CORPORATIONS, REF. NO. 2006-30-114 (2006), available at
http://www.treas.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630114fr.html#fig2 (reporting processing year
2006 return numbers for partnerships and S corporations).
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advice is not binding on the IRS or its representatives, even when it is
erroneous. 178 IRS agents often give informal oral or written advice to
taxpayers in an effort to help taxpayers understand the Service’s
viewpoint on a question. However, the utility of this advice is severely
limited because it does not represent an official ruling, and the IRS is
able to change its position if it is beneficial for it to do so. Thus,
taxpayers have been warned that they should rely on this kind of
informal advice “at [their] peril.” 179 If the Service wants to enter into a
cooperative compliance regime, however, then it will not only need to
make the availability of informal advice more widespread, but also
increase taxpayers’ ability to rely on that advice. 180
2. Preferred Review Status
The cost and resources required to participate in ongoing real-time
audits with the IRS is not trivial. As such, taxpayers may not be willing
to enter CAP if the payoff for the dedication of extensive resources does
not extend beyond a single filing cycle. Moreover, as CAP participants
go through several tax filing cycles, they should develop a good
understanding of the Service’s expected tax compliance norms.
Similarly, the IRS should have gained significant insight into the
taxpayers’ filing habits and practices. As a result, it may be appropriate
at some point (e.g., after five years of participation without any
significant issues) to consider implementing a multi-year preferred
compliance program, including a potential moratorium on standard audit
activity. 181 Taxpayers could instead have shorter, more focused reviews
of their returns, and preferential access to the PFA and PLR processes
on an as-needed basis. These taxpayers should also be able to have
increased access to informal ad hoc advice that will be able to assist
them in gaining certainty pre-filing and shield them from strict
liability. 182
Notwithstanding the potential negative political perception of relaxed

178. See, e.g., Clarke v. Comm’r, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 398 (1994); Ferreira v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summary Op. 2001-167. Moreover, the IRS is not stopped from later correcting errors of law that it
makes in advice to taxpayers. See, e.g., Demirjian v. Comm’r, 457 F.2d 1 (3d. Cir. 1972), aff’g 54 T.C.
1691 (1970) (where taxpayer claimed detrimental reliance on a letter from the district director).
179. United Block Co. v. Helvering, 123 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1941).
180. For example, it may be able to for a rebuttable presumption against the imposition of
penalties.
181. LMSB Subgroup Report, supra note 90.
182. A LBEs former CAP Account Coordinator, for example, may be able to provide this type of
assistance in a relatively cost effective manner because of his or her in-depth familiarity with the
taxpayer’s filing history.
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oversight of the cooperative LBEs, moving proven compliant taxpayers
into a more lenient process, at least for a predetermined number of years,
will allow the IRS to free up significant resources and bring new
taxpayers into the CAP system. 183 In addition, some kind of fail-safe
mechanism could be put in place which would only extend a taxpayer’s
preferred status grace period to the extent that no material issues come
up during subsequent spot reviews. This would help keep taxpayers
from taking advantage of their relaxed oversight and give the IRS a
mechanism by which they can bring offending taxpayers back into preCAP status if necessary.
C. The Sorting Effect
Changing to a strict default penalty level for LBE taxpayers, while
contemporaneously expanding pre-filing assistance, will have the effect
of providing a sorting mechanism for two kinds of taxpayers:
cooperators and non-cooperators. 184 Cooperators, or those who elect to
opt-in to CAP or have issues resolved under the other pre-filing
programs, will signal that they are willing to be open and transparent
with the IRS in order to gain certainty with respect to their tax filing
positions. It is likely that these taxpayers are ones that either already
lean towards the more conservative side of the tax evasion/tax avoidance
line, or are willing to forgo future aggressive planning activities in order
to reap the economic benefits of cooperation. 185 Non-cooperators, on
the other hand, are much less likely to elect into CAP or use the other
pre-filing cooperative mechanisms. It is more likely that these taxpayers
are either pursuing tax avoidance strategies in a way that will be looked
at unfavorably by the IRS or their general distrust for the IRS is so high
that they believe that any type of cooperation that requires transparency
will lead to a disproportionate increase in their tax liabilities. Even with
respect to the latter type of taxpayer, however, this level of mistrust is
likely to be higher if the taxpayer is a more aggressive filer. As such,
non-cooperators will send a general signal that they have “something to
hide.” 186
Anecdotal evidence suggests that sorting on a smaller scale is already
183. See generally Ventry, supra note 11, at 436 (noting a benefit of cooperative regulation is the
ability to better allocate post-filing enforcement resources).
184. This distinction will be akin to the categories of “gamers” and “non-gamers” put forth by
Alex Raskolnikov. See Raskolnikov, supra note 12, at 689.
185. It is assumed that the CAP IRS agents’ abilities will be sufficiently respected such that the
cooperators are in fact largely transparent in their disclosures with the Service.
186. Nanci S. Palmintere et al., Session 10: Risk of Controversy with the Tax Authorities, 85
TAXES 137, 163 (2007).
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occurring. The IRS believes that one reason for the drop in PFAs in
recent years, as illustrated in Figure 2 above, is because some of the very
same taxpayers who would have come in for PFAs in prior years are
now involved in the CAP program. 187 This is a logical assertion because
both programs involve real-time reviews of taxpayer issues (PFA
addressing single and CAP addressing multiple issues) and require a
posture of transparency and cooperation with the IRS. This suggests
that there is a distinct set of taxpayers who are eager cooperators (i.e.,
are willing to cooperate in the absence of any added pressure to do so).
If, as is suggested, CAP is expanded to be an opt-in regime for a larger
subset of LBE filers, sorting on a greater scale should occur. This
sorting mechanism could be particularly robust with respect to large
LBEs already under continuous post-filing audit if the IRS gives those
taxpayers the option to move some of its post-filing personnel resources
to work with the taxpayer on its pre-filing issues. Cooperators should
sign up, while non-cooperators should resist. 188 The IRS can then use
these signals being sent by LBEs to force even greater cooperation and
compliance. This is illustrated below in Figure 4.

Figure 4

Coops

Non-Coops

Opt-In

Coops

Cooperators

Non-Coops

NonCooperators

Signaling and
targeted
enforcement

187. Elliott, supra note 62, at 45-2 (“There’s a sense that some of our CAP taxpayers are the very
same taxpayers that would have come in for prefiling agreements. It’s possible that, absent CAP, we
would be seeing different prefiling agreement numbers today.” (quoting Cheryl Claybough, director of
pre-filing and technical guidance in LMSB)).
188. Raskolnikov, supra note 12, at 738 (“[I]mproved taxpayer assistance is likely not only to
facilitate the separation of gamers from the rest, but to increase compliance among non-gamers as
well.”).
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An expansion of CAP should improve the overall effectiveness of
post-filing audits in three meaningful ways. First, as more LBEs opt-in
to CAP, fewer companies will require time-consuming post-filing audits.
The majority of LBEs participating in CAP should reach agreement on
all material issues such that no or limited post-filing reviews are needed.
Second, because of the sorting that is accomplished by CAP, the postfiling audit efforts that are expended by the Service will be focused on
those institutions which have signaled that they may have something to
hide. Assuming that largely compliant taxpayers will choose to opt-in,
resources currently directed at would-be cooperators will be able to be
directed towards non-cooperators.
Lastly, an expanded CAP should help increase post-filing audit
detection rates. A significant stumbling block with respect to LBE
audits now is that the IRS has trouble identifying areas of noncompliance on the return. As discussed above, field agents must sift
through thousands of pages of information, in which taxpayers may have
tried to intentionally obscure the presence of any wrongdoing. 189 Under
the proposed cooperative regime, however, non-cooperators should find
their aggressive positions being discovered more often on audit. Service
agents will have the advantage of possessing real-time information
learned from cooperators, which should make it significantly easier to
identify current areas of compliance concern and newly developed
structured tax transactions. Even if the cooperators are on the whole less
aggressive than non-cooperators, the IRS will still learn valuable
information because sometimes the mere existence of a certain type of
transaction or market technology is beneficial to enforcement efforts,
even if the specific cooperative taxpayer at hand has not decided to take
the most aggressive reporting position. It is also possible that certain
cooperator LBEs may strategically choose to propose new aggressively
reported transactions to CAP or PFA agents in order to ensure equal tax
treatment with non-cooperators. If the IRS signs off on a particular
strategy then they, along with their competitors, will be able to book the
tax benefits. On the other hand, if the Service shoots down the tax
treatment, the IRS may then issue preemptive guidance which will
prevent their non-cooperator competitors from taking the benefits as
well.
Ultimately, more effective auditing should move non-cooperators
more in line with cooperators. Eventually, the rewards of cooperation
(i.e., immediate certainty, no strict liability, and decreased planning and
compliance costs) should outweigh the shrinking benefits of evasion and

189. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
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gamesmanship. This should cause more former non-cooperators to optin. As more non-cooperators opt-in, a super-sorting function will begin
to occur as the last non-cooperators to hold out will most likely be the
LBEs with the most to hide. As this number decreases, IRS efforts can
be adjusted to increasingly target these entities until they too are forced
to cooperate.
D. Challenges and Consequences of a Cooperative Compliance Model
1. A Necessary Change in Culture
Both IRS personnel and taxpayers are entrenched in their respective
antagonistic postures. Shifting to a cooperative model may be
procedurally and psychologically difficult to implement. Taxpayers
may legitimately fear that any revelation of their tax plans pre-filing
may result in harsh scrutiny and disproportionately high tax liabilities.
As discussed above, current CAP participants have already complained
that the Service has not embraced the cooperative spirit of the program
and have been very antagonistic, intrusive, and oppressive. 190 However,
under a cooperative model, not only should the IRS cultivate trust
among taxpayers, but it should also deal with taxpayers openly and
honestly and “give taxpayers the benefit of the doubt when it finds a
mistake, by sanctioning small violations more mildly, and by
sanctioning large . . . violations more heavily.” 191 A cooperative tax
regime will be unsustainable if the IRS cannot evolve out of its
adversarial posture.
Like the ATO, which had significant difficulties in changing its large
bureaucratic organizational structure to support its new cooperative
model, 192 the IRS has over 16,000 employees all over the country
engaged in various agency enforcement and compliance tasks. 193
Getting all of these employees, or at least the ones dealing with LBEs, to
buy into a new culture of cooperation and accommodation will likely be
very difficult. Many of the IRS personnel have been submerged in a
deterrent environment pitting them directly against taxpayers for the
entirety of their careers. Extensive training and cultural rehabilitation
would be necessary in order to change their mindsets and dispositions. 194
190. Coder, supra note 82, at 55-3.
191. McCaffery & Slemrod, supra note 11, at 20 (describing policy recommendations of “tax
morale” literature).
192. See generally Job & Honaker, supra note 141.
193. TIGT FY2009 COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 118.
194. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OVERSIGHT BD., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: 2009, at
53 (2010), available at http://www.treas.gov/irsob/reports/2010/IRSOB%20Annual%20Report%

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/4

42

Holmes: FORCING COOPERATION: A STRATEGY FOR IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE
H-HOLMES

2011]

8/27/2011 5:09:08 PM

IMPROVING TAX COMPLIANCE

1457

2. The Need for More Elite IRS Talent
Under a cooperative tax regime, the IRS will need more top talent. In
order for any pre-filing assistance, in the form of CAP, PFAs, or PLRS
to be worthwhile and not result in a disproportionate decrease in
government revenue, the IRS personnel will need to be sophisticated
enough to work through complex tax issues with the LBEs on equal
footing. 195 That is, even if the LBEs are fully transparent and
forthcoming with the government during these processes, the IRS
personnel involved in making the ultimate agreed-to determinations
must be able to fully comprehend the intricacies of the transactions at
issue and the ramifications their decisions may have beyond the
immediate taxpayer’s return. To the extent that LBEs feel like they can
get one over on the Service agents brought in under CAP, they are likely
to revert to non-cooperative, clandestine behaviors under the guise of
full transparency. Such a scenario would put the government in an even
worse position than it is currently in because under the CAP and PFA
agreements, it will be more difficult to go back and unwind or penalize
taxpayers unless egregious violations are found.
Thus, not only will the IRS need more bodies to execute a
comprehensive responsive regulatory system, but many of those bodies
will ideally need to consist of some of the nation’s top legal minds.
While salary competitions between the government, law firms, and
LBEs would almost undoubtedly disfavor the government, Congress
should be mindful of the real cost savings that can be achieved by
implementing this approach and be willing to re-allocate some of the
capture into efforts to procure more elite tax talent.
3. Other Issues
In addition to cultural changes, the IRS will have to deal with other
challenges such as budgeting limitations and guarding against
corruption. First, because it is more difficult to quantify results in CAP
compared with the traditional audit process, allocating resources will
pose a challenge for the government. The IRS has historically been
limited in resources and funds even when workload increases. 196 In
order to get the funding necessary to meaningfully expand the pre-filing

202009.pdf (recounting a panel discussion in which it was acknowledged that “to change an
organizational culture takes a very long time and a committed leadership over a period of years”).
195. See generally Schizer, supra note 5 (exploring ways in which the Service can upgrade its tax
talent).
196. See generally Ventry, supra note 11, at 456.
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programs, it will be necessary to convince the budget makers of the
long-term benefits. 197
Second, to the extent individual IRS personnel are given latitude in
dealing with individual taxpayers through the pre-filing resolution
programs, it is important to protect against corruption and agency
capture, which can increase when authority is devolved in a system with
high levels of discretion. 198 While it is important to balance the need for
consistent decision-making and equity against the considerations of
individual taxpayer circumstances, disparate treatment by IRS agents
among taxpayers can undermine the integrity of the cooperative system.
CONCLUSION
There is an old proverb that you can catch more flies with honey than
with vinegar. The government and the IRS, however, have continued to
use increasingly harsh methods to procure taxpayer compliance. The
failures of the Service’s current deterrence-based model and the success
of Australia’s cooperative transformation should prompt the government
to seriously consider instituting a more friendly tax regime. Although
the cultural and psychological barriers that exist for both LBEs and the
IRS as a result of their long-lasting adversarial postures towards each
other are significant, the rewards of a successfully implemented
cooperative regime should make the costs and pains of transition
worthwhile.
Once a cooperative compliance norm is established, both sides should
be able to realize greater benefits than they do under the existing
deterrence model. Although many LBEs may not willingly buy into the
new accommodative system, they can be induced to do so. This Article
proposes a framework for helping induce and transition LBEs and the
IRS into a new cooperative compliance era. The multi-faceted approach
will not only help reduce uncertainty and the compliance costs of
taxpayers, but also augment IRS enforcement efforts by providing a
dynamic sorting mechanism that enables them to better target noncooperators. Although the implementation of this cooperative model
would be an extreme undertaking, it has become increasingly clear that
the IRS can no longer afford to continue with the status quo if it intends

197. This is more challenging with the “pay as you go” norms employed by lawmakers, which are
designed to ensure that the cost of any government spending increase or tax cut is offset by a
simultaneous equal spending cut or tax increase.
198. See, e.g., Job et al., supra note 11, at 92; see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1565 (1992) (defining the capture
hypothesis).
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to use the corporate tax base as a significant source of income going
forward.
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